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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of interest rate cuts on investment behavior. The methodology is to simulate investment 
decision making under different capital costs. The experiment showed that decreasing interest rates encourage risk-taking. 
With the decreased interest rate as borrowing costs the risk taking increased weakly but continuously. The risk taking 
increased strongly when the interest rate reached zero. Thus the experiment showed excessive risk-taking when there 
were no capital costs. This finding supports the hypothesis that extreme expansive monetary policy with low, zero or 
negative interest rates encourage financial bubbles and overinvestments or wrong investments in the real economy. 
Keywords: quantitative easing, anticyclical monetary policy, monetary business cycles, financial crisis policy, zero 
interest rate policy, experimental simulation with roulette 
JEL Classification: E 43, E 47, E 58 
1. Introduction 
The Federal Reserve implemented an extreme expansionary monetary policy (Quantitative Easing) and turned to 
unconventional monetary policy tools such as forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases. The ECB and the central 
banks of Switzerland, Sweden and Japan went one step further and set their target rates below zero (zero interest rate 
policy). This monetary policy is controversial and its effects barely researchable, because the influence of monetary policy 
on the economy cannot be isolated. There are too many additional factors (Nishad Nishad, 2018). The development of 
growth rates in Japan also raises doubts as to whether there will be positive effects if the zero interest rate policy is applied 
over a longer period of time. Rather, this policy of cheap money is made responsible for exaggerations on stock markets 
(Conrad & Stahl, 2002) even including the financial crisis. The allegation is that money is wasted and used for risk-taking 
if it costs nothing. 
Historically, the question is very controversial as to how a central bank can generate real growth through monetary policy 
instruments. According to monetarism, real gross domestic product growth cannot be artificially generated by an 
expansionary monetary policy. Friedman and Schwartz used historical time sequences and economic analyses to argue 
that changes in the money supply had unintended adverse effects, and that sound monetary policy is necessary for 
economic stability. Hayek and Wicksell even blamed the central bank for boom and bust cycles (Wicksell, 1922; Wicksell, 
1898; Hayek, 1935; Friedman & Schwartz, 1969).  
Against such a background this paper examines the effects of interest rate cuts on investment behavior using an experiment. 
Human behavior is examined in this context. The methodology is to simulate investment decision making under different 
capital costs. How does the borrower with the borrowed money act in relation to the price of the borrowed capital? They 
may be bank or non-bank investors. The business banks borrow the money from the central bank and then invest it by 
lending it to private borrowers just as private investors borrow the money from the banks to invest it, for example, in their 
own companies, real estate or equities. 
In section 2 the existing literature and studies are presented and compared to the experiment presented here. Section 3 
explains the experimental design of the study. Finally, the results are presented (section 4) and the conclusions drawn 
(section 5). 
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2. Related Literature 
“The more money there is the better it is for the economy”, is the conclusion of most studies about quantitative easing 
(Gagnon, 2016) and “the lower the better” is their conclusion for the interest rate. For a long time it was common sense 
that nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero. This barrier was called the “lower boundary.” Scientists have been 
discussing how to break the Lower Boundary to achieve more economic stimuli since the financial crisis. The arguments 
for and against a zero-percent policy can be found at Tymoigne (Tymoigne, 2018).  
There have been numerous studies about zero interest rate policy, or negative interest rate policy. For example, Cúrdia 
estimates that in the US, the decline in GDP during the recession would have decreased by half a percentage point if the 
Fed had lowered the federal funds rate to -0.75% (Cúrdia, 2019). The question arises as to what other consequences follow 
from subsidizing credits by the central bank. If money is cheap it may be wasted like every other product.  
So others argue that low interest rate policy could lead to a buildup of leverage, or asset bubbles by encouraging excessive 
risk taking by financial market participants (Conrad & Stahl, 2002; Caruana 2013; Feldstein 2013; Stiglitz 2016). 
Confronted with low interest rates bank and non-bank investors may switch to excessive risk in order to compensate the 
smaller interest income (Hannoun, 2015).  
The mechanism is called “search for yield”. If financial institutions have long-term commitments (such as pension funds 
and insurance companies) they come under pressure to earn the yield they promised on their liabilities. If they obtain only 
a low interest return on their assets they might be forced to go in risk (Rajan, 2005; De Nicolò, Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, & 
Valencia, 2010). Unilaterally constructed bonus-based compensation schemes encourage excessive risk-taking and were 
one reason for the financial crisis (Conrad, 2015). 
Empirical studies show (e.g., for Spain, Maddaloni & Peydró, 2010; Ongena et al., 2009) that credit standards tend to 
loosen when policy rates decline. Maddaloni, Peydró-Alcalde and Scope (2009) show that if overnight rates are lowered 
credit standards are loosened. 
De Nicolò and others (2010) found a negative relationship between the monetary policy rate and ex ante risk taking in a 
study about US banking policy. The average internal risk rating by banks and the spread over the federal funds rate decline 
as monetary policy rate increases. They also test the relation between interest rate to the ratio of the bank’s risk-weighted 
assets to total assets of U.S. commercial banks and bank holding companies using their quarterly financial statements 
(Call Report filings). They find a strong negative relationship between real interest rates and the riskiness of banks’ assets. 
The relationship is weaker when bank capital is low. 
Expansive monetary policies and low interest rates, especially long lasting ones, have been made responsible for credit 
booms and excessive risk taking. The context is as follows. Lower interest rates lead to higher asset prices and borrower’s 
fortune, in turn allow higher and cheaper lending. Analytical models (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), show more risk-taking 
when interest rates decline and vice versa a reallocation to more quality and safe investments when interest rates rise. The 
withdrawal leads to less availability of external financing.  
Easy and cheap money access encourages greater risk-taking, which leads to asset bubbles. Later crashes of such bubbles 
could be damaging for the real economy. If they take place in the housing market they may affect balances of credit 
institutes and thus lead to credit crunches, which affect the real economy severely (Conrad & Stahl, 2002; Claessens, 
Kose & Terrones 2012; Mian, Sufi & Verner 2015). The cheap central bank money is seen as a reason for the US housing 
market bubble. The relatively low interest rates in the U.S. during 2001-04 resulted in a rapid increases in house prices 
and household leverage (Lansing, 2008; Hirata et. al, 2012).  
Accommodative monetary policy is blamed as one reason for the global financial crisis. Persistently low real interest rates 
and excess liquidity fueled a bubble as a boom in asset prices and securitized credit and seduced financial institutions into 
take on increased risk and leverage. Had central banks raised the interest rates earlier and more aggressively and 
preempted this buildup of risk, the consequences of the burst would have been much less severe (Borio & Zhu, 2008; De 
Nicolò, Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, & Valencia, 2010). Claessens and Kose state that whether and how monetary policy affects 
risk taking, and thereby asset prices and leverage, remains a subject for further research (Claessens & Kose, 2013). 
This paper details a simple incentive-based experiment regarding investment behavior in relation to borrowing cost based 
on roulette. There have been several experiments with roulette but with the objective to scrutinize the gambling behavior 
(Rubio, Hernández & Santacreu) and guessing tendencies (Rubio, Hernández, Zaldvíar, Márquez & Santacreu, 2010). In 
2015 there was a roulette experiment, that simulated most common short-term bonus compensation schemes without 
accountability (Conrad, 2015).  
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3. Roulette Experimental Design  
The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that decreasing the interest rate to zero encourages excessive risk-taking 
in the financial system. The methodology is to simulate investment decision making under different capital costs. 
Therefore an experimental environment similar to the investment conditions had to be constructed. Roulette has the 
advantage of clearly demonstrating the probabilities for gains and losses. In the original game (apart from zero) the 
probability of losses is compensated with higher payouts. A higher risk has an equivalent higher payout.  
The experiment was conducted with 107 students from different Business Bachelor courses at the University of Applied 
Science HTW at Saarbrücken. The students played 3 rounds of Roulette (A, B and C), each with three games. They could 
bet on red or black, on one of the three thirds of the 36 numbers or on one number. The winning number and color was 
determined by the roulette wheel. If it was zero, the game was repeated and not registered. The payouts were distributed 
according to the probability of winning (x2, x3, x36). 
The task was to invest borrowed capital like a manager of a company. The participants were asked to maximize the profit 
as it is the obligation of a manager as agent for a principal (company owner resp. shareholder). Maximal profit in the 
group resulted in 10€ real money as variable compensation. In order to reduce change in behavior due to learning effects 
the game consisted of three rounds each with three games. Learning effects should therefore arise early with small 
influence. 
In order to simulate investment behavior with different interest rates thus capital costs, decision-makers were be exposed 
to three different investment situations. In round A they were allowed to borrow up to 10,000€ (maximum) at 10% interest, 
in round B at 5% and in round C at 0%. Losses and gains were credited at 100%. The payouts could be reinvested and 
were accumulated in each round and afterwards the borrowed capital deducted. The results of the rounds A, B and C were 
added and the player with the highest result was rewarded with €10 real money. The rules were explained to the students 
before starting the experiment. The students were asked to check each other's calculations after each game. This simple 
experiment shows clear results.  
4. Results 
The sum of the average borrowed capital rose from €5,439.93 in round A to €9,931.78 in round C, thus by 81.03%. The 
sum of the average capital set rose from €7,211.05 in round A to €14,244.15 in round C, thus by 97.53% (see figure 1 and 
2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Average borrowed capital 
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Figure 2. Average set capital 
How was the risk behavior? The highest possible profit (calculated as the product of the set capital and the possible payout 
multiple) in all three games rose continuously from €37,483.12 in round A to €98,754.77 in round C, by 163.46% (see 
figure 3). The significantly higher standard deviation in round C shows that some players were more willing to take risks 
than the average (see figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Average maximal possible gain 
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Figure 4. Standard deviation maximum possible gain 
If you set the maximum possible gain in relation to set capital as a risk measurement indicator, the willingness to take 
risks increased by 33.27% from 5.20 in round A to 6.89 in round C (see table 5). The same development shows the risk 
measurement indicator maximal possible gain in relation to the borrowed capital as a risk measurement indicator. The 
willingness to take risks increased by 46.67% from 6.90 in round A to 10.04 in round C (see figure 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Maximum possible gain in relation to set capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00 €
20,000.00 €
40,000.00 €
60,000.00 €
80,000.00 €
100,000.00 €
120,000.00 €
140,000.00 €
160,000.00 €
standard deviation maximum possible gain
round A round B round C
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
maximum possible gain/set capital
round A round B round C
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 6, No. 4; 2019 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Maximum possible gain in relation to borrowed capital 
How were the results? How successfully did the investors set their capital? The average gains of round A and B with 10% 
and 5% interest rate stayed pretty much the same (A: €51.68 and B: €63.60€) whereas in round C the students realized an 
average loss of €297.66 (see figure 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Average game result 
Table 1. Statistical data 
 Round A Round B Round C 
Average borrowed capital €5,430.93 €7,759.81 €9,831.78 
Average set capital €7,211.05 €9,617.37 €14,244.15 
Average maximum possible gain  €37,483.12 €56,466.74 €98,754.77 
Standard deviation average  
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Interestingly, with the decreased interest rate as borrowing costs, the risk taking increases continuously, which means that 
there are proportional effects of the borrowing costs to the risk behavior. But the strongest reaction was detected at zero 
interest rate, where there were no capital costs.  
5. Conclusion 
The experiment showed that decreasing interest rates encourage risk-taking. With the decreased interest rate as borrowing 
costs the risk taking increased weakly but continuously. The risk taking increased strongly when the interest rate reached 
zero. The experiment showed excessive risk-taking when there were no capital costs. With no capital costs the average 
result of the game was a net loss, whereas before there was a small profit. It seems that if money is free, human beings 
react less rationally. This finding supports the hypothesis that extreme expansive monetary policy with low, zero or 
negative interest rates encourage financial bubbles and overinvestments or wrong investments in the real economy. Bank 
and non-bank investors are less prudent and rational the less the capital costs are and extremely irrational and incautious 
if there are no costs at all.  
Decreasing the interest rate to zero encourages excess risk-taking in the financial system. Low interest rate policy could 
lead to a buildup of leverage, or asset bubbles by encouraging excessive risk taking by financial market participants. Bank 
and non-bank investors may be encouraged by low interest rates to take excessive risk in their search for profit, which 
can create asset bubbles on the stock market and housing market. If they are financed by credit, credit crunches and strong 
economic downturns may follow, which caused the 1929 financial crisis (stock market crash), followed by the great 
depression and the financial crisis of 2008 (housing credit crisis).  
Moreover, it has been demonstrated (Conrad, 2015) that unilaterally constructed incentive schemes encourage excess 
risk-taking. This would indicate that common bonus-based compensation schemes enhance risk because of the 
asymmetries in the treatment of gains and losses. Unilaterally constructed compensation schemes were one reason for the 
financial crisis. 
After the financial crisis many central banks turned to quantitative easing (QE) to support economic growth. In order to 
reduce long-term borrowing costs they purchased massive and unprecedented amounts of long-term bonds, which created 
liquidity and decreased the long term borrowing costs. Some central banks even pushed short-term interest rates slightly 
below zero to stimulate the economy. But the slow recovery, especially in Europe, has raised questions about the benefits 
of QE bond purchases versus their detriments and whether their effectiveness has reached a limit. 
The example of Japan should give pause. Japan is a pioneer of zero interest rate policy and quantitative easing. In 2001 
and 2013, the Bank of Japan implemented zero interest rates alongside quantitative easing. Neither managed to stimulate 
the economy sustainably or to increase inflation (Drozd, 2018). Often when pursuing an inflation target, we forget that 
we are in a long phase of globalization with falling import prices. In particular, the goods made in China are pushing 
down prices for many consumer goods.  
The question remains as to why the long period of low interest rates in Japan has not led to a second bubble. For a bubble, 
a constant inflow of liquidity is required, which is financed by loans. After the real estate and equity crash in Japan in the 
1980s, Japanese banks still had a lot of bad credit on the books after huge write-offs. They were not recapitalized, so even 
if they wanted to make the same mistake again, they lacked the equity to real estate and equity loans. Rather, one spoke 
at that time of a credit crunch, since the Japanese banks and the real economy barely forgave loans for lack of equity, 
which is why the economy stagnated at a low level. Dell’Ariccia, Laeven and Marquez (2013) showed that the extent of 
bank capitalization appears to be an important factor for recovery. They found out that facing a lower interest rate, a well-
capitalized bank is willing to give more credit, it decreases its monitoring and takes more risk, while a highly levered, a 
low capitalized bank does the opposite (Dell’Ariccia, Laeven & Marquez, 2010; Claessens & Kose, 2013). 
There are a lot of market distortions due to the market intervention of the central bank apart from the shift to investments 
with higher yields. If the interest rate is below the inflation rate, there are redistributive effects from creditors to debtors. 
Insurance companies and pension funds do not have enough earnings to meet their obligations. Money market funds 
might not earn enough to cover their costs of running. The pension of the population becomes a problem, as the interest 
income is missing. The effects of a prolonged zero interest rate phase on the financial system has not yet been handled in 
depth. Banks lack the float profits from loaning their deposits, as well as the margin between investment and lending rate. 
Negative investment rates are usually not enforceable on the market and neither is a high credit margin if the refinancing 
rate is zero (Arteta, Kose, Stocker & Taskin, 2016). Lowering the interest rates thus means narrowing net interest 
margins—the gap between commercial banks’ lending and deposit rates. Several studies found a positive relationship 
between short-term interest rates and net interest margins. A low interest rate environment has the adverse effect on banks’ 
profitability (Claessens, Coleman & Donnelly 2016; Borio et al. 2015).  
The Bank Lending Survey of April 2016 already noted a collapse in European bank profit as a result of low interest rate 
policy and quantitative easing (Arteta, Kose, Stocker, Taskin, 2016). If the banks lack income, equity is also lacking to 
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lend and to survive new crises. The zero interest rate policy is thus counterproductive. In addition, if the central bank buys 
corporate and government bonds, it shuts the commercial banks out of this market, especially since it lacks the expertise 
to manage corporate risk. The financing of enterprises by state organizations is not market-compliant, but characteristic 
of centrally planned economies. 
All studies assume an interest rate responsiveness to investments. As we know from the Great Depression of 1929, this 
does not have to be the case. If the expectations of return on investments are negative, interest rates would have to be so 
negative that they more than offset losses on the investment. But then it would be less risky for companies if they did not 
invest the money but let it go and take the central bank's negative interest rates as a safe return. 
The expectations of the return on investments must not only be negative due to poor economic expectations, they can also 
be due to a lack of competitiveness. For example, in spite of zero interest rates, nobody would invest in Greek hotels if 
the comparable Mediterranean holiday in Portugal is much cheaper due to lower labor costs. 
Falling interest rates, on the other hand, always affect equity and real estate prices. For one thing, they are the alternative 
form of investment to bonds and, on the other hand, they can be financed by loans. If the cost of credit decreases, the 
present value of real estate and equities increases. The demand for shares and real estate and thus also the price will rise. 
The profits of companies increase due to lower borrowing costs, which also increases the demand for shares and thus the 
price. 
In conclusion, one can say that the side effects of an extremely expansionary monetary policy such as zero interest rate 
policy, negative interest rate policy or quantitative easing are so great that such an intervention in the markets is only 
justified in a Keynesian depression situation (Great Depression) as in 1929 and 2008 and only for a limited time. One can 
only warn against recent suggestions, such as de-bundling cash from electronic currency and making cash depreciate 
relative to electronic currency, to further reduce key interest rates to negative territory (Assenmacher & Krogstrup, 2018), 
because the negative effects of these options are not predictable. 
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